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I.  Introduction
     Globalization of business is an accepted fact as is the growing power of multinational
corporations (MNCs).
1  A desire for peace also seems to be globally accepted.
2  What is less
certain is whether the power of multinationals can be harnessed to help achieve peace.  Desire is
not enough.  Practical policies and procedures must be implemented to help reach this goal.
Discussions of peace through commerce mention certain preliminary conditions such as justice,
good governance, transparency and giving individuals voice as necessary requirements.
3  A tool
increasingly being discussed and implemented to deliver and maintain these conditions is
whistleblowing.
     Whistleblowing is a procedural way to reinforce the transparency necessary to free trapped
capital,
4 encourage foreign investment and move economies, especially transitional ones,
5 away
from reliance on personal relationships and bribes.
6  To the extent that there is a positive
correlation between corruption, poverty, and violence,
7 the need for whistleblowing is
reinforced.  Empowering individuals to combat cronyism and call into question economic
                                                
1 See generally, DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (1995); Phillip M. Nichols, Regulating
Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 260-61 (1999)
(calling economic and commercial globalization “the most powerful force shaping the world as it enters the twenty-
first century; he also cites political fragmentation, or decision-making at the local level, as a complementary force);
Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429 (1997).
2 See Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Makahiki:  The Governing Telos of Peace, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 301, 310-11 (2001);
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83-84 (1980).
3 See, e.g., Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, Responsible leadership in action, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, A
FIN. TIMES GUIDE, Dec. 2000, at 13; Norsk Hydro, a member of the PWBL Forum, advertises that openness,
accountability, and honesty are at the heart of their business practices.  Wouldn’t it be better if we worked together?,
ad in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, A FIN. TIMES GUIDE, Dec. 2000; Fort, supra note 1, at 309; Timothy L. Fort & Cindy
A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace, VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming
2002).
4 See Peter Wonacott, Chinese Corruption Has Sliced Up to 16% Off GDP Over Decade, Study Estimates, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 8, 2001, at A18; Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 16.  It can do this in two ways--by reducing bribery and
giving citizens a voice in their government.
5 See John Reed & Erik Portanger, Bribery, Corruption Are Rampant in Eastern Europe, Survey Finds, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 9, 1999, at A21.  The story reports on a survey done by the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development.  It found that companies pay bribes that amount to as little as 2% of annual revenue in Croatia to
8% in Georgia.  The “bribery tax” fell especially hard on small companies.  Id.; Wonacott, supra note 4; Peter Eigen,
The Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey, at www.transparency.de/documents/cpi.bps.html; David Hess
& Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption:  A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption),
33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 596 (2000) (noting that in the former Soviet Union, 60% of the companies paid bribes
compared to 15% of businesses in industrial countries).
6 See, e.g., Lucinda A. Low & Katherine Cameron Atkinson, Led by the U.S., the World Wages War on Corruption,
NAT’L  L.J.,Mar. 3, 1997, at B9; John Plender, Weeding out corruption, FIN. TIMES, .Apr. 25, 2000, at 16; Hess &
Dunfee, supra note 5, at 597-98 (noting that secrecy is a defining characteristic of corruption) and at 606.  The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, consisting of 34 Western nations, called for transparency
and financial disclosure to help combat bribery in its Inter-American Convention Against Corruption.  Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, Organization of American States, Third Plenary Session (Mar. 29, 1996),
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html.
7 See Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 5-9.  They cite the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index,
which ranks countries by perceived level of corruption, and the Heidelberg Index of Violence which ranks conflicts
by level of intensity.  Comparison of these indices indicates that the countries with the least amount of corruption
were involved in the least number of violent conflicts; the most corrupt in the most violent conflicts.  Id.  See also id.
at 26.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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decisions made for personal gain rather than the general good should allow more resources to be
allocated to those at the bottom of the economic scale.
      Professors Fort and Schipani have persuasively argued that corporations can have the greatest
impact on peace through mitigating internal (v. international) conflicts and the way in which
corporations are governed makes a significant difference in the ethical values leading to
mitigation of these conflicts.
8  Whistleblowing as a governance tool becomes even more
important in this context because it encourages responsive, and thereby responsible governance
practices.   It gives individuals a say in their organization, and contributes to a feeling of
procedural justice.  Giving individuals a regularized way to speak and be heard also helps
reinforce democratic ideas.  This check on power is crucial for an effective democratic
institution.
9  Globalization often leads to a feeling of disempowerment and creates conditions
which allow a few to benefit at the expense of many.
10  Whistleblowing leads to accountability,
and accountability helps defuse the resentment
11 and opportunities for corruption.
     When whistleblowing is used to enforce just treatment norms, inter-ethnic, inter-gender, and
inter-religious interaction and notions of equal treatment can be fostered.  This is already true in
the United States in terms of sexual harassment.
12  Such interaction
13 and enforced equality helps
to defuse conflict.
14
     The growing dominance of multinational corporations allows them, in some respects, to act as
independent states outside of the effective control of particular countries.
15  Thus, it is
appropriate to consider the goals and restraints these multinationals impose on themselves, as
well as those that are externally imposed.
16  In the United States, and to a lesser extent in other
common law countries,
17 companies are being compelled and/or encouraged to establish codes of
conduct and whistleblowing procedures to enforce them.  This paper discusses whether these
                                                
8 Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 4.  See also Fort, supra note 2, at 309.
9 Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 61.
10 Id. at 33-34.
11 The ability of an individual to wreak havoc increases with the growing reliance on technology and electronic
communication.  See, e.g., Don Clark, Security Experts Are on Alert Over Wireless Hacking Technique, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 15, 2001, at B7.
12 See infra part B. 2.
13 Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 63 (interaction creates personal relationships, which helps break through
stereotypes)..
14 “Violence occurs in many forms in addition to wars between nation states.  Conflicts and grievances obviously
arise when one person or group feels that they have not been justly treated.”  Fort, supra note 2, at 309.
15 Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Globalization, “Asian Values,” and Economic Reform, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 711, 712,
715 (2000); Jost Delbruck, Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order:  International Law
in the Era of Globalization, SWISS R. INT’L & EUR. L. (forthcoming 2001).
16 Alan  Pike, An unrelenting pressure, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, A FIN. TIMES GUIDE,  Dec. 2000, at 4.  As noted
by Kofi Anan, U.N Secretary General, this is a voluntary declaration of principles, not a legally binding compact.
Carola Hoyos, principles of globalisation, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, 6; Fort, supra note 3, at 303.
     Contractarianism and communitarianism share the premise that corporations will be primarily self-governing.
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Timothy L. Fort, & Cindy A. Schipani,  Integrating Trends in
Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance:  Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and
Employee Empowerment, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 11 (forthcoming 2002).
17 Many European MNCs also have ethics officers and codes.  This is in line with attempts to develop procedures for
corporate disclosure on social issues, auditing procedures, and the Global Reporting Initiative.  Hess & Dunfee,
supra note 5, at 624-25.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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practices and goals can be harnessed to help deliver on the promise of peace through
commerce.
18
      The first section of the paper examines the rationale for whistleblowing, it’s growth in the
United States, and the adoption or rejection of whistleblowing in other countries.  The second
section examines the cultural dimensions of whistleblowing and whether it is practical for
multinational organizations to adopt it as a governance tool.  It is suggested that adoption is
feasible if appropriate reporting procedures and ethical norms are adopted, and allowance is
made for some cultural adaptation.  Finally, the advantages of open reporting and
communication procedures to the corporation and the peace effort is discussed.
II.  The Growth of Whistleblowing
A.  Why Whistleblowing?
     The most commonly accepted modern definition of whistleblowing is “the disclosure by
organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the
control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able  to effect action.”
19  As
indicated by this definition, it is seen today as an employee action.  This has not always been the
case.  For example, the council of the city-state of Venice instituted it to help fight corruption
and to give citizens a more meaningful voice in their government.
20  The U.S. Congress, building
on an idea adopted from much earlier English legislation, passed a whistleblowing law as a way
to supplement governmental resources in fighting fraud during the Civil War.
21  The recent
emphasis on whistleblowing, however, began with Ralph Nader’s 1971 call for its
implementation as a means to stem organizational wrongdoing.
22  There are many reasons why it
is an idea whose time has come again.
     Work organizations, both governmental and civil, are growing in size and complexity, and
individuals are often little more than “cogs” in the organization in which they work.
23  Individual
jobs have also grown in complexity, and as a result they have become more specialized and
expertise-based.
24  This, in turn, makes the detection of wrongful conduct more difficult due to
lack of  knowledge or access to information.
25  At the same time, the information and technology
revolutions have increased the opportunities for significant fraud and other harmful and illegal
                                                
18 Nichols, supran note 1, at 263.
19 MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (1992); Terrance D.Miethe & Joyce Rothschild,
Whistleblowing and the Control of Organizational Misconduct, 64 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 322, 323 (1994).
20 SUSIE BOULTON & CHRISTOPHER CATLING, VENICE & THE VENETO 88-89 (2001).  In the Sala della Bussola in the
Doge’s Palace, for example, there is a “bocca de leone” or lion’s mouth.  The lion’s mouth has a slit through which
citizens could slip secret denunciations.  Catching tax evaders was one goal; another was state security.
21 Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. 696 (now called the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988)
(The objective of the act was to punish government contractors who were, among other things, selling sawdust for
gunpowder.); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:  Financial Incentives
for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 303 n. 112.
22 Ralph Nader, A Code for Professional Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1971, at 43.
23 Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 19, at 328; Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a
Global Environment:  The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 837 (2000).
24 Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 19.  They have also become more professionalized.
25 Id.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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activities.
26  Whistleblowing is seen as one way to obtain, or regain societal control over the
large organizations that increasingly dominate society.
27
     The premise behind recent governmental promotion of whistleblowing is that people of
conscience work within these large, complex organizations, and would normally take action
against wrongdoing except for fear of losing their jobs or other forms of retaliation.
28  Thus, if
adequately protected from retaliation, they will come forward with evidence of wrongdoing
before it would be detected externally, if discovered at all.  Harms from the wrongdoing could be
reduced, wrongful behavior stopped, and the expense of public oversight and investigation would
be reduced if such reporting occurs.
29  Also, if whistleblowing proved a relatively common
occurrence, wrongdoing would decrease because potential wrongdoers would be aware that their
activities were not as secret as they might otherwise be.
B.  The United States Experience
     While initially discussed in the early 1970s, it took significant disasters such as the explosion
of the Challenger
30 and food poisoning,
31 and publicity about extensive contractor fraud
32 for
whistleblowing to become a common tool of control.  All three branches of government, at both
the federal and state levels, have now adopted measures designed to encourage whistleblowing.
33
While all measures contain protection for the reporter from retaliation, they vary considerably as
to other issues
34 such as to whom the whistle should be blown,
35 whether motive should be
considered,
36 whether the whistleblower may benefit from reporting,
37 what standard of evidence
                                                
26 See id; Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 14-15.
27 U.S. efforts to obtain or regain societal control over business organizations date back to the Industrial Revolution.
See George C.S. Benson, Codes of Ethics and Whistleblowing, in WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP? 53 (Gerald Vinten, ed., 1994).
28 Janet P. Near, Terry Morehead Dworkin, & Marcia P. Miceli, Explaining the Whistleblowing Process:
Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 393 (1993).
29 Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:  Protecting the Interests of the
Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J.266, 305 (1991).
30 See, e.g., NASA to Probe Transfer of Engineers At Thiokol After Damaging Testimony, WALL ST. J., May 14,
1986, at 4.
31 The first state to pass a whistleblowing statute, Michigan, did so after a poisonous fire retardant was mistakenly
shipped to feed grain cooperatives instead of the intended nutritional supplement.  Farmers lost millions of dollars,
and residents suffered serious health effects, some of which could have been avoided if employees had come
forward.  They testified they did not because they had been warned they would lose their jobs if they did so.  Terry
Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes:  Are They Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 243
(1987).
32 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 21, at 303.
33 Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection,38 AM. BUS.
L.J. 99, 99-100 (2000).
34 Other issues not addressed in the text include sanctions by some states against the individuals who retaliate
against the whistleblowers, whether the report of wrongdoing must be in writing, and what the appropriate statute of
limitations should be.  See Terry Morehead Dworkin, Legal Approaches to Whistle-blowing, 232, Table 6-2, chapter
in  MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE (1992).
35 Dworkin & Callahan, supra  note 29, at 267.
36 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 21, at 318-25.
37 Id.  There is more uniformity at the federal level, where legislators show less concern about motive and the
identity of the report recipient, and are more willing to allow significant financial rewards for useful information.
Id. at 278-83.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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of wrongdoing should be required,
38 and what remedy should be provided to a whistleblower
who suffers retaliation.
39
As public policy supporting whistleblowing has matured, there has been a shift toward
encouraging internal whistleblowing and away from the almost exclusive legislative emphasis on
reporting outside the organization.  This represents a change in emphasis away from a primary
focus on punishment by governmental bodies toward earlier and more complete cessation of
wrongdoing.
40  It also saves public funds.  There are many other advantages to internal reporting.
It accords with the actions of most whistleblowers,
41 is less harmful to the organization and the
employee,
42 and is considered more ethical.
43  A variety of laws and decisions both directly and
indirectly have caused employers to establish internal whistleblowing procedures in order to reap
the benefits to organizations and the government that these reports can deliver.
44
The most important direct cause of organizational establishment of internal
whistleblowing procedures
45 is the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines.
46  The Guidelines, which
determine penalties for corporations convicted of federal crimes,
47 take a “carrot and stick”
approach toward curbing organizational wrongdoing.  Convicted organizations that have made
little or no effort to prevent or reduce wrongdoing suffer increased monetary penalties
48 and
sanctions, including probation,
49 and mandated negative publicity.
50  Reduced fines and
avoidance of sanctions are provided for organizations that, in good faith, have attempted to stop
and detect misconduct.
51  A written code of ethics, a meaningful reporting system,
52 and
                                                
38 See Dworkin, supra note 34.
39 Dworkin, id.; Dworkin & Near, supra note 31, at 260-64.
40 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 21, at 306.
41 Miceli & Near, supra note 34.
42 Near, Dworkin & Miceli, supra note 28, at 399.  Studies of whistleblowers indicate that the best predictor of
retaliation is external whistleblowing.
43 For example, Sissela Bok, in her book, SECRETS (1989), cites internal whistleblowing as more ethical if it is
feasible because sounding the loudest alarm first by reporting outside the organization is an act of disloyalty to
colleagues and employees.  If the problem can be solved internally, the destructive side-effects of external reporting
can be avoided.  Id. at 221.
44 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 29, at 305-08, for a more through discussion of the benefits.
45 See Janet P. Near & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Responses to Legislative Changes:  Corporate Whistleblowing
Policies, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1551, 1560 (1998); Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1991, at A1.
46 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,786-97
(1991).
47 The Sentencing Reform Act, passed in 1984, established the Sentencing Commission.  The Commission, under a
mandate to reduce disparities and judicial discretion in sentences, promulgated the Guidelines.  After establishing
guidelines for individual felons, the Commission established the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines.  See id. at
22,787; Near & Dworkin, supra note 45, at 1551.
48 Penalties assessed in a given case depend on a “culpability score “ which increases the multiplier for factors such
as involvement of high-level corporate officers in the crime, or previous convictions for the same crime.  Sentencing
Guidelines, note 46.
49 Id. at 22,791.  A convicted organization with fifty or more employees that does not have an effective compliance
program is to be put on probation and ordered to put such a program in place.
50 Id.; Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations?  Punishment by Publicity under the New Sentencing
Guidelines, 65 CAL. L. REV. 2387 (1992).  Other penalties include fines that are sufficiently large to divest the
organization of its net assets.  Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at 22,789.
51 Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at 22, 789-91; Corporate Compliance Programs Can Play Role in
Organizational Sentencing, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 195, 196 (Feb. 13, 1992).
52 The Guidelines specifically mention hotlines as an acceptable internal reporting mechanism.  Additionally, to
qualify for the reduced penalties, the organization is supposed to report the wrongdoing discovered through theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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protection of whistleblowers from reprisals are key characteristics of an acceptable deterrence
and detection program leading to the reduced fines and sanctions.
The Supreme Court has also prompted organizations to establish codes and internal
reporting procedures through its harassing environment sexual harassment decisions.
53
However, most organizations establish them for the limited purpose of controlling harassment
and not for the reporting of other kinds of wrongdoing.
54  In the harassment decisions the Court
recognized a defense to harassing environment sexual harassment suits for firms that make
reasonable efforts to prevent and correct harassment.
55  An effective complaint procedure is a
central element of such a program.
56  This defense is also applicable in cases claiming
harassment on such bases as religion, race, national origin, and disability.
57
Revisions to the False Claims Act (FCA)
58 (the law mentioned above that was passed
during the Civil War) has also spurred the establishment of intra-firm reporting frameworks.
59
While the act itself encourages external reporting through the filing of a lawsuit in the
government’s name, the extraordinarily large whistleblowers’ awards, fines and recoveries paid
to the federal government, and dramatic increase in FCA whistleblowing, have led many
organizations, especially those in the defense and healthcare industries to, self-police.
60  Under
the FCA, whistleblowers who successfully prosecute FCA claims against individuals or
organizations which have fraudulently claimed federal funds receive up to thirty percent of
recovered monies.
61  Because of the amount of fraud, treble damages, and fines as high as
$10,000 per false claim, the average recovery for a successful FCA whistleblower is over one
million dollars,
62 and the government has recovered over three billion since the law was revised
                                                                                                                                                            
internal reporting procedure to the government or cooperate with the government.  Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 46, at 22,793.
53 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
54 Earlier decisions and political events such as the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings also
resulted in many large businesses establishing harassment reporting procedures.
55 The defense requires the employer to prove that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexually
harassing behavior and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of  employer-provided corrective
measures.  See Burlington Industries, Inc., at 744 (1998); Faragher at 775.
56 In several states, the requirement that employers provide education on sexual harassment, including information
regarding internal reporting procedures, is imposed by statute.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 3A (2000);
R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-51-2 (2001).
57 See Debbie M Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work Environment: The Challenge of
Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2000-2001); Terry Morehead
Dworkin & Ellen R. Pierce, Is Religious Harassment “More Equal?”, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 44, 76 (1995);
Harassment Rulings Reinforce Need for Policies and Procedures (BNA) 76 (June 21, 2001)(discussing disability
harassment).
58 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1988).
59 See Charles Pereyra-Suarez & Carole A. Klove, Ring Around the White Collar:  Defending Fraud and Abuse, 18
WHITTIER L. REV.31, 36-7 (1996).
60 See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 33, at 101.
61 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (3)(d) (1988).  If the government joins the suit, the whistleblower gets up to 25% of the
recovery.  The government has joined in about 15% of the suits.  See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 33, at 101
n.9.
62 See Qui Tam Statistics, 12 FCA & QUI TAM Q. REV. 41 (1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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in 1986 to 1999.
63  FCA suits increased from an average of six per year pre-revision of the Act,
to approximately two per day in 1999.
64
The widespread judicial adoption of a tort-based theory of wrongful firing in violation of
public policy provides a similar indirect incentive for companies to provide internal reporting
channels.
65  In many states, courts have specifically recognized this theory in whistleblowing
cases.
66  Because employers who use their power to subvert public policy are usually perceived
as especially wrongful, recoveries in these cases commonly include punitive damages and are
quite large.
67
     This discussion of incentives is not exclusive.
68  Decisions such as In re Caremark
International, Inc.,
69 suggesting that the failure to have a code of ethics may be tantamount to a
violation of management’s fiduciary duty to shareholders, and pressure from NGOs
70 have also
spurred organizations to examine their ethical stances and system.
71  Whatever the spur, it is
clear that most large U.S.-based organizations, including MNCs, now have some form of
reporting procedure.
C.  Whistleblowing in Other Countries
     While whistleblowing as a control mechanism is most pervasive in the United States, it has
been adopted or is being considered in many other countries.  This development is most
pronounced in countries with a common law tradition.  Promotion of whistleblowing in these
countries reflects the U.S. experience.
72  Initially, there is great reluctance to embrace
whistleblowing.  A precipitating scandal or series of incidents which receive widespread
publicity and which involve insider knowledge of the problem is usually the motivating factor
causing a country to move from denial to consideration or passage of legislation.  It is assumed
                                                
63 See FCA News, 18 FCA & QUI TAM Q. REV 18 (2000).  Representative Howard Berman, a main sponsor of the
1986 FCA amendments, stated another $3 billion more was expected to be recovered from pending litigation.  Peter
Aranson, The Whistleblowing Juggernaut, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A1, A12.
64 See Aranson, supra note 63 (quoting prosecutor Joyce Branda).  There are many other statutes that give rewards
for whistleblowing, but none give the whistleblower as significant or sure an award.  Callahan & Dworkin, supra
note 21, at 278-283; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Symposium:  Innovations in Environmental Policy:  The Continuing
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 226 (discussing awards for information leading to
convictions for environmental crimes).
65 See Dworkin &Callahan, supra note 21, at 285-95.
66 See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz. 1986)(en banc); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743
S.W.2d 380, 385 (1988).  For a complete list, see Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 33 Appendix.
67 See, e.g., Paraclesus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 15 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1172 (Nov. 4, 1999); Verdicts
& Settlements, NAT’L L.J., June 26, 2000, at A16.
68 See, e.g.,Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1989), as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989); FREDERICK ELLISTON, JOHN KEENAN, PAULA LOCKHART & JANE VAN SCHAICK,
WHISTLEBLOWING 16-19 (1985) (regarding reporting procedures established by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission) ; Jamie R. Welton, In the Wake of the Columbia/HCA Investigations:  Plotting a Course for Medicare
Compliance, 7 ELDER L.J.217, 247 (1999) (discussing the risks of Medicare noncompliance).
69 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
70 NGOs, or non-governmental organizations, are comprised of international charities, aid agencies, and other
pressure groups, and are growing in number and influence.  Alan Pike, confronting the critics, in RESPONSIBLE
BUSINESS, A FIN. TIMES GUIDE,  Dec. 2000, at 17.
71 See John Plender, Unpopular Capitalidsm, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 16 (citing the Seattle riots, Greenpeace,
and the presidential campaigns of Gore and Nader, among other factors); David Gresing, Shades of Seattle Riot as
Clinton Addresses Elite Economic Forum, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, at C13 (citing Davos protests).
72 See supra  notes 30-32 and accompanying text.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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that knowledgeable insiders could have prevented the problem had their information reached the
proper ears.  It is also assumed or stated that had the insiders been protected from retaliation, the
information would have been appropriately conveyed.
     In the United Kingdom, for example, legislation was spurred by well-publicized, often tragic
events such as the “Lyme Regis canoe case” in which four children drowned because of
inadequate safety equipment and training at a recreational facility.
73  After several years of
consideration, the Public Interest Disclosure Act was enacted by Parliament in 1998.
74  The law
shows a strong preference for internal whistleblowing.
75         Whistleblowing legislation
introduced in New Zealand
76 followed by four months a well-publicized incident there.
77
Australia’s statutes followed well-publicized retaliation against whistleblowers.
78
       As in the  U.S. legislation, all these laws protect the whistleblower from retaliation, but they
vary in most other respects including the kind of information about which protected disclosures
can be made, the quality of evidence of wrongdoing, the motive for the whistleblowing, whether
the whistleblower can benefit from the disclosure, and the report recipient.
79  While the details
vary, it is clear that the idea of whistleblowing as an organizational control mechanism is
spreading through common law countries.
80  Legislative spurs for organizations to establish
internal reporting mechanism are not as yet as powerful as in the United States.  As in the U.S.,
                                                
73 See, e.g., Gary Slapper, Will these deaths be avenged?, THE TIMES,  Mar. 5, 1996, at 37.  This case was one of
four featured on a program aired in January 1996, on BBC Channel 4, highlighting the retaliation against
whistleblowers in Britain.  In the Lyme Regis case, an employee had written a letter to her employer about safety
problems and was dismissed.  She made her letter public after the deaths.
     In another case that garnered much attention, 18,000 elderly investors lost their savings and taxpayers incurred a
150 million pound expense after the collapse of an investment firm.  Again, there was a noted failure of
whistleblowing.  The official inquiry into the crash of the firm, Barlow-Clowes, noted that some of the employees
must have known that they were engaging in something improper.  However, the inspectors also noted that, “the
position of the `whistle-blower’ is frequently extremely uncomfortable.  The most likely result of such `whistle-
blowing’ would be an immediate—if wrongful—termination of employment.”  Don Touhig, How to protect whistle-
blowers, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at News Review 4.
74 Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, ch. 23 (Eng.).  The Act amended the Employment Rights Act of 1996.
75 Whistleblowers are protected under the Act if they make a “qualifying disclosure.”  Id. at 43B.  A qualifying
disclosure is made “if the worker makes the disclosure in good faith—(a) to his employer” (id. at 43C (1)(a), or
someone designated by the employer.  Id. at 43 (C)(2).  The worker is allowed to go outside the employer to report if
it is reasonably necessary.  Id. at 43G.(2).
76 The Protected Disclosure Act 2000 was enacted in January 2001.  See
http://www.ombudsmen.govt.nz/protecte.htm.
77 Catherine Weber, Whistleblowing and the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994, 7 AUKLAND U. L. REV. 933
(1995).
78 Whistleblower Protection Act 1993 No. 21, S. AUSTL. ACTS & ORD. (1993); Protected Disclosures Act 1994 No.
92, N.S.W. INC. ACTS (1994); Robert Baxt, The public interest or improper use of information—the dilemma for the
insider environmental whistleblower, AUSTL. BUS. L. REV., Aug. 1996, at 319, 322 ns. 2,3; Richard Evans, When
honesty doesn’t pay, L. INST. J., June 1994, at 459.  A commission was appointed in 1993 to examine the form that
federal legislation should take, and whistleblowing legislation had been debated even earlier.  David Lewis,
Employment Protection for Whistleblowers:  On What Principles Should Australian Legislation Be Based, 9 AUSTL.
J. LAB. L. 135, 135-36 (1996).  The Whistleblower Protection Act can be found at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Legislation.htm.  See also Public Service Act 1999, § 16 (Austl.).
79 See, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Models of Whistleblowing in the International Environment 4-12 (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
80 Ireland and Canada have also considered whistleblowing legislation.  See Jane Baker Jones, Whistleblowing:  No
longer out of tune, AUSTL. ACCT., Aug. 1996, at 56; A & L Goodbody, Irish Law Newsletter, Pension Trustee – As
“Whistleblower” and Other Developments, BUS. MONITOR, Feb. 1, 1996.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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though, the idea of promoting internal whistleblowing is also being established through rules
regarding sexual harassment.
81
     There has been greater reluctance to adopt whistleblowing in other countries for reasons that
are discussed below.  While EC countries other than England have not embraced whistleblowing,
they were made aware of it and the need for protection of whistleblowers through the case of
Stanley Adams.  Adams, a senior executive at the Swiss company Hoffman-La Roche, reported
the company’s anti-competitive conduct to the EEC Commission for Competition.
82  Switzerland
signed the Free Trade Agreement with the EC in 1972, and Adams assumed his disclosure would
be protected under this agreement.
83  Adams asked the Commission to keep his identity
confidential, and the Commission did not begin investigations until after Adams resigned and
moved to Italy.
84  During the investigation, Adam’s identity was inadvertently revealed to his
former employer, which had him arrested when he returned to Switzerland
85 and he was held
incommunicado for three months.  Adams’ Italian business ventures failed, his wife committed
suicide, and he was found guilty of economic espionage.
86  He was later imprisoned in Italy after
the failure of his businesses there.  Hoffman-La Roche was found guilty of anti-competitive
activities.
87  This case received wide publicity, and the European Parliament adopted a resolution
instructing its Legal Affairs Committee to consider the implications of the case.
88  However, no
protective legislation resulted.
89
     Whistleblowing in the EC has also been considered in response to the amount of fraud that
has been discovered.
90  Initially discussed in the early 1990s, it arose again several years later
when Paul van Buitenen blew the whistle on the Commission’s failure to deal with fraud.
91
Although his coming forward eventually led to the mass resignation of the Commission and
                                                
81 See, e.g., Sex Discrimination Act of 1994, 20 FCR 217 (Austl.).  Additionally, companies operating in the United
States are likely to have reporting procedures in those operations even though they may not have them in their
operations outside the U.S.
82 Neville March Hunnings, The Stanley Adams Affair or The Bitter Bit, 24 COMMON MKT. REV. 65 (1987).
83 Id.  at 70-71.
84 YVONNE CRIPPS, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 12 (2d ed. 1994).
85 Hoffman-La Roche instituted proceedings in Switzerland for the theft of its documents when it learned that the
EC had received information contained in the company’s documents.  Adams was arrested on charges of economic
espionage in violation of § 273 of the Swiss Penal Code.  Id.
86 Hunnings, supra note 82, at 73.
87 The company was found guilty of violating Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome because it abused its dominant
position in the vitamin market.  Cripps, supra note 84, at 13.  The company was fined the equivalent of 180,000
pounds.  This was reduced by one-third on appeal.  Id.
88 Id. at 14.
89 As a result of the report to the European Parliament, the Parliament requested that the Commission of the EC
make a payment to Adams to compensate him for the psychological and physical consequences of his
whistleblowing.  He was paid 25,000 pounds, which was less than his expenses.  He appealed his claim for damages
to the European Court of Justice, and was partially successful.  The court found in his favor, but allowed only half
the damages claimed because they found Adams to be partially responsible for his damages because he did not
inform the Commission that it was possible to infer his identity from the documents that were handed over to
Hoffman-La Roche, he did not ask to be kept informed about the progress of the investigation, and he returned to
Switzerland without investigating the progress of the investigation.  The Parliament also asked the Commission to
give the Legal Affairs Committee an assurance that in the future people who revealed information of activities that
were contrary to the EEC-Switzerland trade agreement would not be prosecuted in the Swiss Courts.  Id.
90 Michael Dybes, EU told to protect `fraud busters’, THE TIMES, June 2, 1995, at Overseas News.  The amount of
detected fraud in 1994 exceeded 816 million pounds, and this was estimated to be only the “tip of the iceberg.”
91 Neil Buckley, Kinnock ushers in cultural revolution, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20,2000, at 3.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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several changes in controls within the bureaucracy, no measures were adopted to protect
whistleblowers who, like van Buitenen, suffer retaliation.
92
III.  Can Whistleblowing be Globally Applied?
     The question posed at the beginning of this paper was whether the increasing adoption by
MNCs of codes of ethics and whistleblowing procedures could be harnessed to help deliver on
the promise of peace through commerce.  The impact of these mechanism will be greatly limited
if they can only be applied when companies operate in common law countries.  As the Adams
and van Buitenen cases discussed above illustrate, there is still great reluctance to embrace
whistleblowing procedures.  This, then, raises the questions of whether it is practical or ethical
for MNCs to try to enforce such procedures regardless of where they operate.  I argue that it is
despite the varying cultural norms involved.
A.   The Cultural Dimension
     The reluctance to consider or encourage whistleblowing has a definite cultural component and
varies by country. As discussed above, modern (nonpolitical)
93 whistleblowing has been a
Western phenomenon.  The countries that have adopted it have common law-based legal systems
in a society that prizes individualism.  While “snitching” in general is not condoned, the idea of
law enforcement through citizen enforcement has long roots in England and the United States,
and whistleblowing has been advocated as a way to control large organizations for over 30
years.
94  However, in some Western countries such as France, Greece, and Luxembourg,
whistleblowing is seen as little different from informing the government about dissident views of
neighbors or colleagues, which was frowned on at least in part because this was considered an
attribute of totalitarian or Communist states.
95    In Germany whistleblowing was thought
unnecessary because of moral superiority.
96
                                                
92 Avenue of the Americas:  Lucky Guy, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2000, at 11.  While van Buitenen has not retained his
position, he has received several awards for his whistleblowing, including being named “European of the Year” by
READER’S DIGEST.  He received $10,000 in prize money, and intended to put it into a fund to help other
whistleblowers around Europe.  Id.
93 Ethicist Sisela Bok distinguishes legitimate whistleblowing from government-endorsed reporting for ideological
or religious persecution purposes.  I adopt this distinction here.  See Bok, supra note 43, at 213.
94 But see Peter Drucker, analogizing  whistleblowing to “informer systems set up by monarchs or dictators, cited in
George C. Benson, Codes of ethics and whistleblowing, 7 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 37, 39 (1992).  Benson
supports internal whistleblowing.
95 Michael Dynes, EU told to protect `fraud busters’, THE TIMES, June 2, 1995, at Overseas News.
96 Peter Norman, Comment & Analysis:  A hidden hand of corruption, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 5, 1996, at 27.
Norman discusses a cultural denial of corruption and financial malpractice in Germany despite clear evidence to the
contrary including fraud surveys conducted by KPMG in 18 countries, and statements from officials.  Wolfgang
Schaupensteiner, Frankfurt’s top anticorruption prosecutor, called the corruption in the building industry in terms of
bribes paid to government officials for public works contracts as being on a “Sicilian scale.”  Id.  The Deputy
Director of the Christian Democratic Union in the Bundestag stated, “[A] few years ago [corruption] was almost a
foreign word in Germany.”  He also stated that, “[s]een internationally, I am convinced that we still have relatively
healthy structures.”  Id.
     When the author discussed the idea of whistleblowing with lawyers and law professors in Germany in 1996, no
one had heard of the idea, and their reaction was that it was a peculiar idea, at best; the more common reaction was
that it was bizarre, destructive and unnecessary.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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     The idea of reporting the wrongdoing of one’s group is alien to many other cultures in which
group membership rather than individualism is the norm.  In Japan, for example, the tradition of
consensus, company mentality, and lifetime employment, makes whistleblowing almost unheard
of and highly risky.
97 One employee who defied this tradition, an ex-Honda engineer who
allegedly quit in a dispute over safety issues, is now a plaintiff’s expert witness in the United
States in suits against Honda
98.  His testimony provides an income that he could no longer earn
in Japan because of his dissent.
99
     One explanation for these differences can be drawn from several studies that show basic
differences in value systems between national cultures.
100  The differences can be described in
several ways, but one which incorporates dimensions relevant to whistleblowing is that proposed
by Hofstede.
101  He identified five dimensions on which cultures vary:  power distance,
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and Confucian dynamism.
102  These
dimensions will influence ethical decision-making and, in turn, affect support for
whistleblowing.  Of these five, the first two and the last are most relevant to examining
whistleblowing among cultures.  Cultures with a high power distance more willingly accept that
power in organizations is unequally distributed among individuals and are more willing to accept
inequality, autocratic leadership and centralization of authority.
103  Cultures high in
individualism have a loosely-knit social framework in which people believe they are responsible
for themselves and their immediate family instead of believing they are members of an in-group
which will look out for them.
104  A society which scores high in Confucian dynamism is a
dynamic, future-oriented society, while a society low in this dimension tends to be tradition-
bound and static.
105
     These classifications are, of course, only tools of analysis, and countries may vary in where
they are on a continuum in each dimension.
106  Nonetheless, they may help explain why the
                                                
97 Benjamin Weiser, An Ex-Employee As Hostile Witness:  Honda Faces Unusual Critic, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar.
6, 1996.  Whistleblowing is “very much out of character and rare” in Japan.  Id. quoting Professor Daniel Foote of
the University of Washington School of Law.  Professor Setsuo Miyzawa of Kobe University is quoted as saying,
“A whistleblower would become `a marked man.’”  Id.
     “[T]he likely reaction of a Japanese worker who stumbles on alleged wrongdoing would be to protect his
company’s image and reputation, to save face at any cost.”  Valerie Reitman & Michael Schuman, Men’s Club,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1996, at R17.
98 Id.
99 “In America, `the squeaky wheel gets the grease.’”  In Japan, “the nail that stands out gets pounded down.”  Hazel
Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self:  Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98
PSYCHOL. REV. 224, 224 (1991).  These sayings exemplify the differences in acceptance of dissent in the U.S. and
Japan.
100 See, e.g., GERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES:  INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK RELATED
VALUES (1980); F. TROMPENAAR, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE:  UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL
BUSINESS (1994); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self:  Implicatins for Cognition,
Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224, 224 (1991); D. Vogel, Business Ethics:  New Perspectives on Old
Problems, 33 CAL. MGMT. REV. 101 (1991).
101GERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES:  INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK RELATED VALUES
(abridged ed.) (1984).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 65-109.
104 Id. at 148-175.
105 For a description of the influences of Confucian theory on a corporation see Stoltenberg, supra note 15, at 719.
“`[T]he practice of civility and mutual respect’ encouraged by Confucian teaching was commonly regarded as a
`humane’ and superior alternative to the enforcement of laws on `unwilling or recalcitrant subjects.’”  Id. at 721.
106 There are also individual variations within a culture.  See Markus & Kitayama, supra note 99, at 226.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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United States, Australia, and England are some of the first countries with whistleblower
legislation, and other countries are more reluctant to accept the idea.  Japan is a low-scoring
country on individualism, relatively low-scoring on dynamism, and high-scoring on power
distance.
107  People living in a low individualistic, high power distance country are less likely to
challenge authority and those in authority are less likely to tolerate challenges. Additionally,
loyalty to the group will be stronger in this climate, thus making reporting on someone within the
group less likely.
108  Finally, going against societal norms to blow the whistle is less likely in a
low-dynamic society.  The United States, Australia and England, by contrast, are countries which
score at the high end on the individualism and dynamism dimensions, and low on power
distance.
109  Thus, people in these societies are more likely to challenge authority and doing so is
more likely to be socially acceptable.  Even if it is frowned on, people are more likely to do so if
they, as an individual, feel it is the right thing to do.
     This analysis does not imply that whistleblowing procedures cannot be successfully
implemented in countries like Japan.
110  It does indicate that it will be more difficult, and MNCs
will have to carefully consider and structure what they ask their employees to do if internal
reporting is to be used as an ethical control mechanism.  It may be easier now than it would have
been even a decade ago for two reasons.  First, the societies studied are dynamic.
111  Japan, for
example, is slowly moving away from life-time employment as its economy worsens, and
independent thinking and challenges to authority are becoming more common.
112  Second,
whistleblowing is increasingly being discussed and considered on an international scale so it is
not as radical an idea as it once may have appeared.  Korea, a country that lies along the same
                                                
107 See also id  discussing non-Western views, especially Japanese, of the self as part of an encompassing social
relationship in which, “one’s behavior is determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the
actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the relationship.”  Id. at 227.  This contrasts with
a Western view of the self, “whose behavior is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one’s own
internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action . . . .”  Id. at 226.
108 This is because the society will be more collectivist in nature.  See Joseph Sanders, V. Lee Hamilton, &
Toshiyuki Yuasa, The Institutionalization of Sanctions for Wrongdoing inside Organizations:  Public Judgments in
Japan, Russia, and the United States, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 871 (1998) for a discussion, in part, of collectivist views
and the view of sanctions in Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington.  One finding was that the Japanese were more likely
to think that individuals should apologize and resign rather than have sanctions imposed against the organization.
109 Hofstede, supra note 100, at 269.
110 The non-Western attributes also apply to countries like China, with its Confucian emphasis on interrelatedness
and kindness (See Markus & Kitayama, supra note 99, at 228), and Latin American, African, and certain southern
European cultures.  Id. at 225.
111 See Stoltenberg, supra note  15, at 9 (regarding China); Phillip M. Nichols, The Viability of Transplanted Law:
Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1235, 1275-79
(1997), for a discussion of how western laws can change society due to the dynamic relationship between culture
and law.
112 See, e.g., Japanese business ethics:  Blow whistles while you work, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2001, at 68; Peter
Landers, The Mighty Pen, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2001, at R5; Yumiko Ono, Ask the Iconoclast:  To Understand Itself,
Japan Calls a Novelist, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2001, at A1; Peter Landers, Teed Up, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2000, at
A1 (describing a court and publicity battle by a top executive of Mitsukoshi Ltd., Japan’s most prestigious
department-store chain, to obtain information about the company spending $550 million to buy land for a golf
course in the 1980s that it never built; the deal was kept secret from him and others, and he was ordered to resign
when he tried to find out about it); Gillian Tett, Japan’s ethical clampdown puts golf out of bounds, FIN. TIMES,
May 19, 2000, at 20 (describing new rules for bureaucrats instituted to help combat corruption).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
13
dimensions as Japan on Hofstede’s scale, is considering whistleblowing legislation as part of its
anti-corruption efforts.
113
B.  How to Overcome These Differences
     In order for companies to successfully implement global ethical codes and internal reporting
procedures, especially in countries that have yet to embrace whistleblowing, three things are
essential:  Reporting procedures must be clear, easy to access, and strongly supported by top
management; Ethical norms should concern relatively few issues which can garner wide
acceptance or understanding; Allowance must be made for some cultural adaptation
1.  Reporting Procedures
     A large number of studies have been conducted on whistleblowers, particularly on what
distinguished observers of wrongdoing who blow the whistle from those who don’t.
114  The most
important predictor is whether there is a clear reporting procedure that is seen as being
effective.
115  Fear of retaliation and protection from retaliation do not seem to play as significant
a role.
116  Additionally, to help overcome the reluctance of employees to report wrongdoing,
especially where it is counter-cultural, the organization must convince the employees that
adherence to its principles and procedures is for the common good of the organization.
     In terms of micro-level theories of deviance, whistleblowing needs to be seen as normative
behavior rather than deviant behavior.  In situations where great emphasis is placed on
organizational conformity and loyalty to one’s coworkers and the organization, the organization
must convince employees that whistleblowing is normative and desired.
117  Social learning
theory can also help explain how whistleblowing can be seen as normal rather than deviant.
Learning takes place through interaction with significant others.  If organizational leaders,
coworkers, or society view whistleblowing as appropriate, then whistleblowing will be seen as
normal and should increase.
118  Even if viewed as deviant within a group, support from important
external constituents can give a person sufficient rationalization to engage in whistleblowing.
119
The reporting requirements below, if implemented and seriously followed, will help achieve this
“normative” behavior.
     To haven an effective compliance program an organization should:
Establish a written compliance program.  This should be clearly written, easily
understood, relatively brief, and lack legal verbiage.  To the extent feasible, employees from all
                                                
113 HEUNGSIK PARK, THE LOGIC OF WHISTLEBLOWING (1999).  Professor Park has been the Associate Director of the
Whistleblower Protection Center (The Chamyeoyeondai) since 1994.
114 Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media and Why:
Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 163 n. 73 (citing studies); Near,
Dworkin & Miceli, supra note 28, at 398-99; Miceli & Near, supra note 19, at 148-152 (and studies cited therein).
115 Near, Dworkin & Miceli, supra note 19, at 398-99; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 114, at 178; Miceli & Near,
supra note 19, at 127-28.
116 Dworkin & Near, supra note 27, at 261.
117 Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 19, at 325.
118 Id. at 326.
119 James W. Michaels & Terrence D. Miethe, Applying Theories of Deviance to Academic Cheating, 70 SOC. SCI.
Q,, 870 (1989); Markus & Kitayama, supra note 99 at 230, n.3..William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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sectors of the organization should participate in the formation of the requirements.  This has two
benefits:  greater investment in the program from the employees and a greater probability of the
code responding to real issues.
120
Train employees regarding compliance.  The training should be done in a way that
engages the employees and causes them to think about what is required.
121  The policy should
stress that employees can be held personally liable for failure to comply,
122 and the organization
may be legally liable for his or her failure.
123  Stress that nonretaliation is an integral part of the
policy and procedure.
Establish a simple reporting procedure.  An individual or office should be designated
as the report recipient.  Establishing a special person for this purpose sends the message that the
organization takes the issues seriously and is open to dissent.
124  Having someone like an
ombudsperson, who is independent of management and reports to the board of directors,
reinforces this message.
125  It also increases the likelihood of reporting and reduces the fear of
retaliation.
126
Investigate and respond quickly.  To the extent possible, the privacy of the parties
involved should be maintained during the investigation.  The response should include a report
back to the whistleblower so s/he knows the company has listened and taken action.
Maintain Strong Auditing.  Someone high in the organization or on the board
(depending on how the reporting procedure is established) should ensure that the system is
working as planned and that responses to reports are appropriate.
127  If patterns of unwanted
behavior emerge, this person should also ensure these are addressed through further training or
other action.
Republish and report.    An annual report should be issued to all employees
summarizing activities.
128  The report should come from the head of the organization.  This
shows that the leadership believes the program is important,
129 reinforces the message that
                                                
120 Callahan, Fort, Dworkin, & Schipani, supra note 16.
121 This can be done in a variety of ways including workshops, live presentations and videos.  See, e.g., LUIS R.
GOMEZ-MEIJIA ET AL., MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 268-74 (2001).  Whistleblowing is more likely to occur in
Asian societies when there is a clear definition of what is wrongful.  Markus & Kitayama, supra note 99, at 231-2.
122 Janet P. Near & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Responses to Legislative Changes:  Corporate Whistleblowing
Policies, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1551, 1558 (1998).
123 There is evidence that Asians are less likely to do a cost-benefit analysis and more likely to report for the good of
the group.  Markus & Kitayama, supra note 99, at 228.
124 See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 114, at 165-66.
125 This is especially important when managers are involved in the wrongdoing.  Id. at 165.
126 Callahan, Dworkin, Fort & Schipani, supra note 16, at 24.
127 Hofstede notes the importance of feedback channels in effectively managing multicultural organizations.
Hofstede, supra note 100, at 274-5.
128 See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 6, at 623-25, regarding the importance of companies reporting progress in
fighting bribery.   They state that this lends credibility, and cite with favor the Global Reporting Initiative.  Id. at n.
181. The reporting must be done consistent with individual privacy concerns.
129 The impression that top-level managers are exempt from the rules is the most likely factor to undermine
acceptance and observance of the rules.  See Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevino, Compliance and Values
Oriented Ethics Programs:  Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 315, 323, 330; Robert C. Ford &
Woodrow D. Richardson, Ethical Decision Making:  A Review of the Empirical Literature, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 205,
212 (1994).  Alternatively, strong support from the top is likely to encourage reporting in Asian societies.  The
Chinese, for example emphasize being loyal and pious to their superiors and obey them, “whether they are parents,
employers, or government officials.”  Markus & Kitayama, supra note 99, at 233; Hofstede, supra note 100, at 259.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 437
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dissent is allowed, and that employees are listened to.  It is also an opportunity to republish the
policies and bring them to everyone’s attention.
     Many MNCs will already have most of these policies in place because they meet the
requirements of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines as well as other legal spurs.
130  One of the
main differences between these suggestions and what many U.S. companies have established in
response to the Guidelines is the establishment of an ombudsperson rather than a hotline.  The
former is preferred because it makes investigation and follow-up
reporting more feasible, and the personal contact is important in fostering reports and
compliance.
131
2.  Appropriate Ethical Norms and Cultural Adaptability
     It is obvious that people will not become whistleblowers if they do not consider the observed
activity wrongful no matter how good the reporting procedures may be.  What is considered
wrongful is affected by culture.
132  Thus, the more globally a MNC’s code is to be applied, the
more difficult it will be to have buy-in from all employees.  To foster participation, the code
should concern relatively few issues that can garner wide acceptance or understanding.  Also, in
order to make it the most effective, allowance must be made for some cultural adaptation.  While
this is not easy, it can be done.
       Probably the easiest norm for employees to understand is compliance with the law. Other
norms on which a company could probably get broad agreement are fair treatment of employees,
protection of the environment, and rules against bribery.  However, within these broad
categories, there is much room for interpretation.  The following discussion, which focuses on
harassment, serves as an example.  Harassment was chosen because it is almost universally
banned or frowned upon in its most egregious forms, legal rules regarding it have led many
MNCs to adopt codes and reporting procedures, it has distinctive cultural interpretations, it
involves ethical duties, and there is evidence of a positive correlation between gender equality
and nonviolence.
133
     The recognition of sexual harassment as a legal and moral issue is relatively recent.  Even
after the adoption of Title VII in 1964, which laid the legal basis for equal treatment of the
genders in the U.S. workplace, harassment was not initially recognized as falling within this law.
It is only in the last two decades that protection from harassment has become a widespread legal
right in the U.S.
134  Today, two forms of sexual harassment are recognized by the courts:  quid
pro quo harassment and harassing environment sexual harassment.  A quid pro quo cause of
action arises when a supervisor offers or threatens to withhold a job or job benefit in exchange
                                                
130 See supra ns. 40-71and accompanying text.  These suggestions are also consistent with the C2 Principles
recommended by Professors Hess and Dunfee in combating bribery.  Hess & Dunfee, supra note 6, at 29-30.
131 Many hotlines allow anonymous reporting.  While anonymity reduces the chances of retaliation, it also
undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the report.  See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 114, at 168-9;
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133 See Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at n. 272.
134 The Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment in 1986.  Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
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for sexual favors.
135  Hostile environment cases arise when unwelcome sexual conduct from any
employee unreasonably interferes with an individual’s job performance, or creates an
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
136 The latter is the kind, discussed above,
for which the Supreme Court recognized a defense if employers make reasonable efforts to
prevent and correct it, including effective policies and complaint procedures.
137
     Other countries and trade organizations have followed the United States and recognized these
forms of sexual harassment and often adopt the same language.
138  However, cultural and legal
differences have resulted in the concept having different meanings or results.  The European
Commission, for example, prepared a Code of Practice that enunciated official recommendations
on workplace sexual harassment.
139  The Commission used the language adopted in the United
States in defining both kinds of sexual harassment , but the Code contained no sanctions and was
non-binding on member states.
140  This left the member states to deal with harassment in their
own way.
141  France chose to distance itself from the U.S. approach, dealing only with quid pro
quo harassment, but making it a crime.
142  Prosecution, though, was generally limited to
situations where the harassment was essentially equivalent to sexual violence.
143  In Germany,
some of the states adopted laws, but they varied among themselves
144.
     Other countries demonstrate wide divergence in attitudes toward and attention directed to
sexual harassment.  In the Czech Republic, for example, many viewed with disapproval what
they saw as the extremes of American justice and the media attention paid to the issue.
145
Additionally, many women did not view the issue as one of individual rights or one that required
laws protecting them,
146 and many women viewed verbal remarks favorably.
147  No laws
addressed the issue, and Czech companies lacked policies pertaining to it.
148  Japan also had no
laws specifically pertaining to harassment, and harassment was dismissed as trivial by both
                                                
135 The employer is strictly liable for such actions.  Id.
136 Id.
137 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
138 M. Starr, Who’s the Boss?  The Globalization of U.S. Employment Law, 15 BUS. Law. 635 (1996); B.H. Earle &
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Communities (Oct. 1987 ISBN 92-825-8764-9); M. Rubenstein & I.M. de Vries, How to Combat Sexual Harassment
at Work, COMM’N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES (1993).
140 A. Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 PA. L. REV. 1227 (1994).  Bernstein posited that the lack of
sanctions resulted from the fact that sexual harassment was not widely viewed as a legal wrong in the EU countries.
141 In response to a proposal from the European Commission (OJ C 337 E, 28.11.2000, p. 196), the Council issued a
decision on December 20, 2000, which established a program for a Community framework strategy on gender
equality.  2001 OJ (L17/22) 19.1.  It does not specifically mention sexual harassment.
142 Abigail C. Saguy, Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence?  Defining Sexual Harassment in American
and French Law, 34 L. & SOC. REV.1091 (2000).
143 Id.
144 See Bernstein, supra note 140.
145 Why Feminism is Faring Poorly in the Czech Republic, CTK NAT’L NEWS WIRE, Mar. 27, 1996.
146 A. Friedrich, Harassment Allegations Seen as Czech Anamoly, PRAGUE POST, July 19, 1995.
147 Id.; E. McClune, Media Leads Dialogue About Whether Sexual Harassment Exists Here, PRAGUE POST, Aug. 2,
1995.
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companies and businessmen.
149  Nonetheless, a Japanese court in 1992 awarded damages to a
Japanese woman who was verbally harassed by her employer.
150
     These are but a few examples of national differences on sexual harassment.  Not only does
this diversity present a challenge to implementing global policies for MNCs,
151
 it also leads to dilemmas for many nationals working abroad.
152   One way to approach these
questions is through the perspective provided by Professors Donaldson and Dunfee in their
integrative social contracts theory that recognizes ethical obligations based on macrosocial and
microsocial contracts.
153  Companies can build on this to develop ways to resolve ethical issues
in a global context using a generic stakeholder theory that is not culturally bound.
154
     Dunfee argues that hypernorms can be used to border or limit the cultural relativism of
micronorms.  If nonharassment is a hypernorm, or if there are hypernorms limiting microsocial
treatment of harassment, then universal rules about harassment could be ethically applied.  A
hypernorm is a principal “so fundamental to human existence that [it serves] as a guide in
evaluating lower level moral norms.”
155  Because of its importance, the hypernorm is likely to be
reflected in global principles that are generally recognized in a variey of ways.  Often
hypernorms are cast in the language of rights.  Are there hypernorms that support a person’s
right to work in an environment free of harassment?
     An examination of numerous global and regional declarations and other documents, such as
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
156 the UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
157OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises,
158 the Council of Europe’s 1996 Social Charter, 
159EC Directives and Codes of
Practice, as well as the laws and philosophies of particular countries, suggest there are three
hypernorms relevant to harassment:  personal security,
160 respect for human dignity,
161 and
                                                
149 D. Niven, The Case of the Hidden Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1992, at 12.
150 Fukuoka Chino Saibansho, Heisei, Gannen (wa) No. 1872, Songai Baisho Jiken (Judgment of Apr. 16, 1992).
151 In addition to the challenges already mentioned, MNCs face an ethical dilemma:  Do MNCs have a moral
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P. Mallor, Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment:  Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125
(1988); B. Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women’s Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 245 (1986); P.
Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job:  Implications for Counseling, 52 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY,539 (1982).
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Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994).  See also THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES
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154 Thomas R. Dunfee, Does Stakeholder Theory Make Sense In a Global Context?,  (paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Int’l Ass’n of Bus. & Soc., Vienna, June 1995).
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156 U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67
th plen. mtg. At 1, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).  This document was part of the
International Bill of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., supp. No. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/565 (1948).
157 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
158 OECD Guidelines, 25 I.L.M. 494 (1986).
159 1996:Europ.T.S. No. 163.
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(1992).
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nondiscrimination.
162  At a minimum, these hypernorms support global rules against quid pro
quo harassment.  Having to trade sexual favors for the right to employment and its benefits
threatens personal security, undermines human dignity, and is generally acknowledged to be
discriminatory.  It is not endorsed by any country.
     Environmental sexual harassment is more problematic since it seldom involves personal
security and there is no general consensus—even in the United States—as to what constitutes a
harassing environment.  Staring, verbal comments, jokes, etc. are not viewed as harassment by
women in many countries.  To the extent that such harassment erodes human dignity and is
discriminatory, it violates two of the hypernorms.  Thus, organizations can ban demeaning,
discriminatory treatment.  What constitutes such treatment, though, should be determined on a
microsocial basis.  Cultural imperialism needs to be avoided, too.
163
     Part of an effective complaint procedure discussed above is having a clearly-written
compliance program along with training.  This is where cultural differences can be taken into
account.
164  Exploration of what constitutes harassing environment in a particular location should
be addressed through seminars, focus groups, and other means.  It is unrealistic to expect that the
U.S. standard for harassing environment would be accepted elsewhere.  However, respecting
cultural differences does not mean respecting the lowest common denominator.
165  A minimum
standard should be set, and the chance for appeal outside the local system should be allowed.
This could be to the person doing the auditing, who would be responsible for ensuring local
interpretation does not set the bar too low.
     MNC implementation of global equal treatment standards reinforced by reporting procedures
is not only feasible but it can also help reduce conflict.  Some studies indicate there is a positive
correlation between gender equality and nonviolence.
166  Creating an atmosphere where inter-
group interactions are fostered under conditions of equal treatment helps defuse conflict.
167 It can
help defuse resentment and limit disruptive behavior through contributing to a feeling of
psychological security
168 and increasing physical security.
169
     A similar analysis could be conducted regarding bribery.
170  Professors Salbu and Nichols, in
their recent articles debating the wisdom of attempting to control bribery through implementation
of global laws, well illustrate the cultural variations in interpreting what constitutes bribery.
171
Professor Salbu, notes that without true global unity, respect must be paid to cultural diversity.
172
                                                
162 THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1989).
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He states that the world today is culturally pluralistic and argues against a forced fit between
externally imposed law and divergent cultures.
173  In furtherance of this argument, he illustrates
the cultural variations in the views of gifts versus bribes.  Professor Nichols focuses on the harms
bribery causes including loss of respect for the law, inequitable distribution of wealth that further
adds to social tension, undermining democracy, and possibly, coups
174 and loss of peace.
175  He
believes it is possible to ban transnational bribery.
     In light of the lack of uniformity is it feasible for an MNC to ban bribery?  Yes.  Every
country in the world prohibits bribery of its officials.
176  This would be the starting point of the
code
177 along with compliance with local laws.  However, allowance for legitimate gift-giving
can be made on a microsocial basis with appropriate discussion and training.
178
     As stated in the introduction, bribery can cause conflict.  One important reason for this is that
it undermines free trade and free trade helps foster peace.
179  Corporations that adopt bribery
bans and enforce them through reporting procedures potentially contribute to peace by allowing
better utilization of resources.
180  This, in turn, frees up more resources for those at the bottom of
the economic rungs,
181 and will have an increased impact in the emerging economies that are
most harmed by bribery.
182  Current writers on bribery all stress the need for transparency.
183
Rules reinforced by whistleblowing can deliver transparency.
IV.  The Contributions of Open reporting and Communication to the Corporation and to
Peace
                                                
173 Id. at 230-31.
174 See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 596 (“Corruption limits a government’s ability to perform vital functions
and may even threaten its overall effectiveness.”)
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5, at 594.
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178 See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 605 (noting the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC)
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179 Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Gifts, Bribes and Exchange:  Relationships in Non-Market Economies and
Lessons for Pax E-Commercia, 33 CORNELL INT’L L. J.515, 517 (2000).
180 Nichols states that bribery could be globally banned by making it a crime when it is prohibited by the laws of the
host country.  Id. at 288.
181 Fort & Noone, supra note 175, at 521; Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 153, at 228.
182 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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     The discussions of bribery and harassment contemplate consideration of local norms in order
to be effective.  The interaction between the rules and local norms is best explained through
small-group training and discussions.  Imposition of rules without an understanding of the
rationale behind them is not very effective.
184  Local, small-group discussions allow explanations
in culturally understandable terms.
185  While whistleblowing is usually an individual activity,
sensitivity to the desired norms can be accomplished on a group basis.  Understanding of the
norms should lessen misunderstandings and unintentionally false alarms.  Additionally, feeling
that one can make an impact at the local level makes one more likely to adopt the community’s
norms.
186  To the extent that the rules have personal meaningfulness, they are more likely to be
followed.
187  Professors Fort and Noone urge this approach in combating bribery.
188 Many
Australian companies train about sexual harassment in small groups through having the male
employees visualize the acts of harassment happening to their wives, daughters and mothers.
Engagement fosters absorption and understanding, and engagement is easiest in smaller numbers
where personal interaction is facilitated.
     Internal whistleblowing procedures and codes of ethics will operate more effectively when
organizations operate as mediating institutions.
189  Mediating institutions are “relatively small
organizations where moral identity and behavior is formed.”
190  Studies indicate that as the size
of an organization increases, individual ethical decision-making behavior decreases.
191  Thus, for
large multinationals, the need for training in relatively small groups at the local level is
heightened.  To the extent that corporate employees cooperate with each other, it may be because
they have internalized trust learned within the organization.
192  Again, this is easier learned
through face-to-face, personal interaction.
     There are benefits to the organization that adopts the discussed policies and procedures.
Global strategic alliances represent a type of competitive weapon.  In order to take the best
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advantage of the alliance, multicultural perspectives must be listened to.
193  Additionally, firm-
specific fairness norms promote efficiency.
194
Organizations that foster internal reporting and open discussion are likely to find that external
reporting will become virtually nonexistent.
195  Problems can be raised and resolved earlier if
employees feel free to engage in discussion and dissent.  Open communication within the
organization has many other organizational benefits as well.
196
V.  Conclusion
     Stakeholders have the ability to wreak “fatal havoc” in business and the world.
197  This is true
of internal stakeholders-employees as well as external stakeholders, especially with the increased
reliance on computers and information.
198  Failure to listen to employees and deal fairly with
them can provide the conditions that foster disruption and possible havoc.  We recently saw the
ability of a few individuals to create debilitating and tragic havoc outside their organizations on
September 11.
     “Corruption and unethical practices in the workplace are . . . thought to result in declining
confidence in major institutions and to contribute to the alienation and anomie     experienced in
modern society.”
199 MNCs which foster reasonable codes and meaningful reporting procedures
can help to defuse disruptive situations. Combining whistleblowing and reporter protection with
a code significantly aids in several ways:  it shows the company means what it says, it gives
employees a way to make sure the organization is legal and ethical, it shows that open
communication will be practiced, and people who speak up will be dealt with fairly.
200
     In addition, MNCs can help in the evolution of a normative global village.
201  They can create
conditions that socialize and empower individuals,
202 and give them the tools to interact more
successfully in their society.
203  To the extent that ideas such as fairness and responsibility for
compliance are learned within the company and are then taken externally, organizations have the
ability to have an impact far beyond their individual realm.
204  At the same time, exporting the
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idea of  whistleblowing helps promote transparency and good government in the larger
society.
205  Organizational norms matter most when law is the weakest.
206
     As countries shift in their commercial institutions from a “relational orientation” to a more
Western “formal orientation” based on the rule of law,
207 whistleblowing could be a helpful
procedure in that transition.
208 It is designed to allow individuals to enforce the rules despite the
individual connections of those in power.  In the words of Alan Watson, “In most places at most
times borrowing is the most fruitful source of legal change.”
209  Borrowing from MNCs which
set the bar higher is also a fruitful source of change.
                                                
205 Giving people a say in the organization’s behavior reinforces democratic ideas.  Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at
20.
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